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THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE
POSITION: A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF
ITS RAMIFICATIONS
United States Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on July 1, 1975,
stated that "[U]nder no circumstances could [the United States] dis-
avow the first use of nuclear weapons."' That comment prompted
questions concerning the circumstances under which the United States
would consider a nuclear first strike.2 During a television appearance,
Secretary Schlesinger gave an example of what might constitute suffi-
cient grounds for the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States:
[We], of course, [have] been a member of the NATO Al-
liance. We have indicated for many years that the strategic
forces of the United States are available for the protection of
the United States and its allies. NATO is a defensive al-
liance. Only in the case of major aggression in which there
I. Address by James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, before Godfrey Sperling
Group, July 1, 1970, at 2 (transcript on file with CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.) [hereinafter cited
as Schlesinger address]; see also N.Y. Times, July 2, 1975, at 8c col. 7. It would appear
that the United States has adopted a first nuclear strike position predicated upon its
foreign alliance commitments. An examination of the basis for this position will be
necessary before considering the possible legal effects of implementation. News inter-
view by James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, before ABC News, Issues and
Answers, July 6, 1975, at 4-6 (transcript on file with CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.) [hereinafter
cited as Issues and Answers].
In late June, 1975, the United States expressed concern over NATO defensive
capability. Having just returned from a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of
NATO, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger discussed the status of strategic balance.
Specific attention was given to recent Soviet military capabilities and their effect upon
the balance of power. A few days later, the Secretary of Defense refused to rule out the
possibility of a nuclear first use. See news conference by James R. Schlesinger, Secre-
tary of Defense, at the Pentagon, June 20, 1975, at 1-2, 6 (transcript on file with CALIF.
W. INT'L L.J.).
2. Schlesinger Address, supra note 1, at 3-6. One consideration contributing to a
United States' policy of first use was expressed by Admiral Gerald E. Miller before the
House Subcommittee of International Security and Scientific Affairs.
I refer to the fact that nuclear weapons have become an integral part of our
support forces. These weapons are complementary to our more conventional
forces. Our allies count on them . . . . [renouncing first use] would force
action, by some at least, to seek their own nuclear weapons capability, thereby
adding to proliferation and increasing the possibility of nuclear conflict.
First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976)
(statement of Vice Adm. Gerald E. Miller) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Nuclear
First Use].
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was the threat or the reality of the overwhelming of conven-
tional forces would nuclear weapons have to be employed.3
The Secretary further explained that tactical nuclear weapons designed
to be employed solely against military targets have been the emphasis
of the United States policy.
4
The following hypothetical illustrates how such a nuclear defense
might occur in the event of a communist block attack on Western
Europe. A NATO full alert is activated on May 15, after intelligence
sources reveal heavy troop and weaponry activity along the East
German and Czechoslovakian borders facing West Germany. Intelli-
gence reports also indicate additional heavy military concentration
surrounding the city Of West Berlin. Just before dawn on May 16, a
simultaneous invasion of Berlin and West Germany is commenced by
communist block forces.
It is determined that the invasion force is using only conventional
weapons, and in response, a NATO conventional contingency plan is
activated. 5 Within hours, it is determined by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) 6 that NATO conventional forces7 are
inadequate to stop the tide of communist -block forces. Because mas-
sive troop and armament loss would be inevitable, SACEUR proceeds
to obtain authorization for the use of tactical nuclear weapons limited
to short and medium range cannons.8 Authorization is received, con-
3. Issues and Answers, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Id. Again, Admiral Miller has expanded on Secretary Schlesinger's comments.
It will become increasingly difficult in the near future to protect U.S.
overseas interests with conventional weapons. It may well be that the threat of
the use of, at least, tactical nuclear weapons is the only option available to us.
Hearings on Nuclear First Use, supra note 2, at 51.
5. See note 26 infra and accompanying text. A discussion concerning pentomic
warfare by William V. O'Brien has been heavily drawn upon in formulating this
hypothetical combat situation. See O'Brien, Some Problems of the Law of War in
Limited Nuclear Warfare, 14 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1961) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien].
Pentomic warfare is the conducting of battle by means of limited nuclear engagements
centered around the concepts of firepower, movement and communications. Id. at 3.
6. '[T]he Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) commands forces of
those West European countries which are members of NATO. These forces are under
operational NATO command as so-called 'assigned forces'." Moritz, The Common
Application of the Laws of War Within the NATO-Forces, 13 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1961).
7. For purposes of this discussion, there are no other NATO forces involved in
the conflict other than the United States.
8. U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual No. 191-31-3; Nuclear Weapons Employ-
ment Effects Data, 7, 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Effects Manual]. This
document provides unclassified information on hypothetical nuclear weapons and deliv-
ery systems such as the short and medium range cannon indicated within the text. Other
such hypothetical systems contained in that manual are: free flight rocket, light guided
missile, medium guided missile, heavy guided missile and aircraft delivered weapons.
The short and medium range cannons would deliver relatively small nuclear devices and
have a considerably shorter range than the other weapons indicated. See generally id.
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ditioned upon compliance with humanitarian safeguards set forth by
the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). 9
United States forces are "conducting a fighting withdrawal." 0 A
designated brigade"1 maneuvers to draw the advancing aggressor into a
position where his tactical ability coupled with the terrain of the area
will place those forces in a vulnerable nuclear attack area. 12 With a
sizable concentration of enemy troops and armament1 3 in a weak
defensive position, a civil affairs representative 14 is consulted to insure
that the civilian population is not unduly endangered. Upon confirma-
tion and command authorization, a 0.5 kiloton nuclear projectile,'
5
fused to preclude fallout,' 6 is fired. The aggressor's momentum is
stopped with a minimal effect on the population.
In this hypothetical, the NATO alliance creates a likely arena of
confrontation while the Soviet block forces merely represent an easily
9. The Nuclear Planning Group is subordinate to the Nuclear Defense Affairs
Committee. NPG is comprised of permanent members consisting of the United States,
United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy along with three other NATO states selected
on a rotating basis. The decision to form NPG was reached at the North Atlantic Council
Meeting, December 15-16, 1966; 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49 (1967). The humanitarian
safeguards, which are hypothetical in nature, will be discussed later. See note 48 infra
and accompanying text.
10. O'Brian, supra note 5, at 3.
II. id.
12. While maneuvering in such a position, United States' forces must also avoid
placing themselves in a position vulnerable to tactical nuclear attack. Id. A vulnerable
nuclear attack area exists where combatants and armament are in a position which lends
itself toward deployment of a tactical nuclear device. Some factors taken into con-
sideration are terrain, weather, noncombatant population and allied troops. Id. at 12-15.
13. For purposes of this analysis the troop and armament concentration will be
considered 2000 troops and 400 tons of armament. For a discussion of nuclear effects on
personnel and property, see Bright, Nuclear Weapons as a Lawful Means of Warfare, 30
MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bright].
14. The civil affairs representative (also referred to as G-5) would be present to
take into consideration factors of a moral, political or legal nature when making a
decision to detonate a nuclear device. In discussing the effectiveness of such a represen-
tative, Mr. O'Brien states: "[A]n effective G-5 can bring strong pressure to bear on a
commanding general when he demonstrates that target selection policies are having a
ruinous effect on the civilian situation." O'Brien, supra note 5, at 11.
15. One kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMIS-
SION, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as ATOMIC
ENERGY COMM'N]. A discussion of the characteristics of nuclear explosions can be found
in Bright, supra note 13, at 2-13.
16. This type of burst is used for the most effective coverage of damage to the
great majority of ground targets of interest to troops in the field. As used in
this manual this height of burst will preclude fallout. It is the height of burst
most frequently used.
U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual No. 101-31-1; Nuclear Weapons Employment Doc-
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recognized aggressor.' 7 The aggressor's use of conventional weapons
sets forth the chain of events leading to a nuclear first strike by one side
or the other. If major aggression is taking place which apparently is
overwhelming conventional forces, the criteria set forth by Secretary
Schlesinger would be met.'
8
While former Secretary Schlesinger's comments renewed nation-
al debate on first use policy, it should be pointed out that the United
States has never foreclosed first use of nuclear weapons.' 9 Further,
there is every reason to believe that this policy will continue under the
Carter administration. 20 It is likely that such a policy would include
concurrently a contingency plan outlining actual implementation pro-
cedures 2' which creates the reality of possible confrontation.
The possibility of a nuclear response to a conventional attack
raises the issue of whether such tactical use of nuclear weapons can be
sanctioned by present international legal standards. This comment
analyzes the relevant international law and concludes that under certain
circumstances the use of tactical nuclear weapons will be sanctioned
by international law. It is emphasized that the absence of a binding
agreement among the nuclear powers fosters the possibility of major
nuclear escalation evolving from an initial tactical nuclear strike. In
recognizing the United States as a proponent of a nuclear first strike,
17. This is not to suggest the impossibility of another arena or aggressor. While
reviewing the Korean situation, National Broadcasting Company's news department on
January 6, 1976, depicted a tactical first strike as a strong possibility should major
aggression take place there.
18. See Issues and Answers, supra note 1, at 3.
19. Six administrations have taken the position that the United States would use
nuclear weapons if "nonnuclear defenses proved inadequate." Hearings on Nuclear
First Use, supra note 2, at 99.
Congressman Les Aspin commented:
[T]he United States has never foreclosed the first use of either tactical or
strategic nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, former
Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Nixon have all declined to
foreclose the potential first use of nuclear weapons and, in some instances,
explicity expressed the willingness to use strategic or tactical nuclear weapons
in the face of a major conventional defeat.
Id. at 193.
20. Long standing precedent in conjunction with President Carter's apparent high
regard for James Schlesinger's advice leads to a reasonable conclusion that the first use
policy will continue under the present administration. The possibility further exists that
Mr. Schlesinger will sit on the National Security Council in his position as energy
advisor. TIME, Dec. 20, 1976, at 12; TIME, Dec. 27, 1976, at 6.
21. A contingency plan is an order to operational forces setting out procedures to
be followed should certain events take place. In this case, the contingent event would be
a full scale attack by an aggressor and the procedure to be followed would involve use of
tactical nuclear weapons. It is impossible to confirm the existence of the contingency
plan because of the security classification of such an order.
4
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this comment urges that state to take the initiative in encouraging such
an agreement.
I. THE WEAPON: ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND PREDICTABILITY
A. Strategic and Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons
Strategic nuclear weapons are those which are deployed against a
major target considered strategically valuable to the enemy.22 These
weapons are often associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) such as Polaris, Poseidon, Titan and Minuteman.23
Tactical nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are those which are
normally used on the field of battle in shorter range delivery systems
and which produce a relatively small atomic yield.24 These particular
weapons are intended for use in situations similar to the hypothetical
advanced earlier in which troops would maneuver to attack a vulner-
able target. Use of a tactical nuclear weapon would be especially likely
in support of an infantry maneuver involving friendly troops in close
proximity to the explosion. 25 In such a case, it would be necessary for
the detonation to be small and result in little, if any, radiation fallout.
The residual effects would have to be kept to a minimum to protect the
fighting capability of friendly forces.
B. The Explosion and Height of Burst
A nuclear explosion results in the release of energy measured in
terms of kilotons or megatons. 26 Initial blast, thermal radiation and
nuclear radiation are the three destructive effects of an explosion.
27
The magnitude of the last-named effect will be determined by the
22. For an overall discussion of strategic nuclear weapons and associated policy
considerations, see generally H. KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR (2d ed. 1969).
23. Rathjens, The Dynamics of the Arms Race, in THE USE OF FORCE 480 (1971).
24. M. HALPERIN, DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR THE SEVENTIES 5 (1971).
25. O'Brien, supra note 5, at 7.
26. Energy release of nuclear detonations is measured in terms of comparative
explosive force of TNT. One kiloton is equal to one thousand tons of TNT, while a
megaton is equal to one million tons of TNT. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at
5-6. The explosion results from either fission, fusion or both where a rapid release of
tremendous energy will result in a rather small area by the fission or fusion of atomic
nuclei. Id. at 12-13.
27. Id. at 29-30, 44-46. The initial explosion causes a blast wave to move away from
the explosion and is considered the most destructive portion of a nuclear detonation. Id.
at 42-43. Thermal radiation comprises one third the energy release and creates tempera-
tures estimated in the millions of degrees. Id. at 7-8. Nuclear radiation has been divided
into initial radiation which occurs the first minute of release after the explosion and
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amount of debris which is uplifted by the explosion, contaminated 28
and eventually distributed back to earth creating fallout. 29 The amount
of fallout is determined primarily by the yield of the weapon and the
height of the burst.
There are four categories into which the burst of nuclear weapons
may be. divided: high altitude, air, surface and subsurface. High
altitude bursts are those which occur above 100,000 feet. Fallout at
that altitude is widely dispersed, however, there is no immediate
hazard on the surface from residual nuclear radiation. 30 An explosion
below 100,000 feet, but high enough to prevent the fireball 31 from
touching the ground is referred to as an air burst. 32 Few surface
materials are drawn up into the fireball, and the radioactive particles
which are produced are lighter, with the result that much radioactivity
is lost by the time the particles reach the surface of the earth.33 The low
air burst has been determined to be the most effective for military
targets while assuring negligible fallout. 34 The surface and subsurface
bursts create the greatest fallout effect. By touching the earth, the
surface burst picks up large quantities of dirt and debris which become
radioactive. Prevailing winds may carry the radioactive debris con-
siderable distances. The fallout created by a subsurface blast will
depend upon the detonation's proximity to the surface. 35 If the under-
ground explosion is sufficiently near the surface there will be signifi-
cant radioactive debris expelled into the air.
36
28. This is a process by which neutrons transfer the weapon's materials, the
nitrogen and oxygen in the atmosphere, and the elements present in soil and water. Id. at
436-37.
29. Id. at 39-40, 704.
30. Id. at 11. There are no surface materials that come in contact with the radiation
at that altitude. That contamination which does exist will remain in the atmosphere a
sufficient length of time to lose most of its radioactive potency.
31. A fireball results with "the sudden release of immense quantities of energy."
Nuclear Employment Manual, supra note 16, Ch. 2, para. 2. As the fireball rises, it
develops into a mushroom cloud in which "the weapon residues incorporate material
from the surrounding medium and form an intensely hot and luminous mass .
ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at 10.
32. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at 10.
33. Id. at 414-15.
34. "The low air height of burst has been shown to give the best 'across-the-board'
damage to most tactical targets . . . while having a 99 percent assurance of not pro-
ducing fallout." Nuclear Effects Manual, supra note 8, at 3.
35. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at 65-66.
36. Mr. Bright has warned: -[T]he actual extent of radioactive contamination
would depend on the depth of the burst, the nature of the soil, the atmospheric condi-
tions and the energy yield of the explosion." Bright, supra note 13, at 12 (footnotes
omitted). See also ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at 436.
6
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C. Predictability of Effects of Individual Weapons
Today it would appear possible to predict with great accuracy the
effects of a specific nuclear explosion37 by taking into account such
variables as yield, fusing, 38 weather and height. Thus, safety dis-
tances, accuracy, radius of effect, property and personnel damage can
be predetermined.39
In the beginning hypothetical, for example, a 0.5 kiloton projec-
tile would be chosen as most appropriate to a tactical combat situation
in which friendly troops are near a relatively small military target.
40
The data in an appropriate manual would indicate the distance that a
projectile will travel and the radius of its explosion a.4 Also, fusing the
weapon for a low air burst would minimize fallout.42 Consequently,
through careful control of the weapon's applications, the military
objective can be attained while both friendly forces and the civilian
population are protected. These factors are critical in determining
whether a particular use of a weapon should be considered legal under
international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The history of war has led the international community to develop
minimum standards to govern the conduct of hostile confrontations
between states.43 Some standards are derived from conventions which
address specific aspects of warfare.' Others have evolved, through
general acceptance among states, into customary international law.45
37. Data concerning hypothetical nuclear weapons is provided in Nuclear Employ-
ment Manual, supra note 16. It is meant to provide unclassified data for target analysis
while training staff officers. United States forces are not to use that manual for field
exercises while non-United States forces may do so. This is in contrast to the Staff
Officers' Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data, FM 101-31-2,
which contains "classified defense information concerning the nuclear weapons in the
U.S. stockpile." Id. at 1-2. That manual has been designed for use in "active nuclear
combat, field training exercises (FTX), and command post exercises (CPX)." Id.
38. Fusing is the process of setting a weapon to detonate at a specified time or
height. Nuclear Effects Manual, supra note 8, at 7.
39. See generally Nuclear Employment Manual, supra note 16; and Nuclear Ef-
fects Manual, supra note 8.
40. For an example of the use of low yield nuclear weapons in a close combat
situation, see O'Brien, supra note 5, at 12-13.
41. See Nuclear Effects Manual, supra note 8, at 12.
42. See note 34 supra.
43. See Mallison, The Laws of War and Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 332 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Mallison].
44. Id. at 3iO-11.
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Still another category is referred to as the general principles of law,
which are the sources "to which international courts have instinctively
referred in the past. ,
46
A. Basic Principles: Humanity and Military Necessity
It has been suggested that any amount or kind of force may be
applied in overpowering an opponent during a conflict.47 However, the
prevailing principles of international law require some standards that
restrain combatants from exercising disregard for the ancillary effects
of their actions. A foundation for such restrictive standards can be
found within the concepts of humanity and military necessity.
The international concept of humanity includes the principle that
war or hostilities should be conducted with the least possible destruc-
tion to human and material values. 48 That principle has been said to
prohibit "the employment of any kind of degree of force not necessary
for the purpose of war, [that is], for the partial or complete submission
of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and
physical resources.' , ' For example, it would be contrary to this
principle for troops to destroy needlessly any property or to indiscrimi-
nately kill when occupying a village after a battle. Such acts would not
be necessary for the purposes of the war and certainly would constitute
unnecessary taking of life.
The principle of military necessity limits destruction to that neces-
sary for attaining lawful military objectives. 50 The United States
Army's official publication on land warfare supports this interpreta-
tion:
The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by
"military necessity" which has been defined as that princi-
ple which justifies those measures not forbidden by interna-
tional law which are indispensable for securing the complete
submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military neces-
sity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbid-
den by the customary and conventional laws of war in as
much as the latter have been developed and framed with
consideration for the concept of military necessity.
51
46. Id. at 63.
47. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY
208-09 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
48. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 529-30 (2d ed. 1%7).
49. U.S. Dep't of Navy Law of Naval Warfare § 220(b) (1955) (footnotes omitted).
50. Mallison, supra note 43, at 312.
51. U.S. Dep't of Army Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 4
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Land Warfare].
8
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An armed force may not commit actions violative of the laws of
war under the guise of military necessity. Destructive acts should be
ordered only when indispensable to the objective of the war and
necessary to protect the safety of the forces concerned. 52 At the
Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal subsequent to World War II, certain
defendants attempted to invoke a defense of military necessity for acts
committed in an occupied territory.53 In United States v. List,54 a
United States Military Tribunal refused to accept that defense and
held:
The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperative-
ly demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end
in itself is a violation of international law. There must be
some reasonable connection between the destruction of
property. and the overcoming of the enemy forces."
Upon a belligerent's attempt to attain victory at all costs, humani-
ty and military necessity then become a limiting factor. To comple-
ment these principles, the customary concepts of proportionality and
respect for the noncombatant should be analyzed next.
B. Customary International Law: Proportionality and
Protection of the Noncombatant
It is a well recognized doctrine of international law that loss of life
must be in proportion to the value of the military objective. 56 The Law
of Land Warfare states that "loss of life and damage to property must
not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained." 57 This
concept suggests that balancing must take place before a specific
weapon is employed. Certainly the injury would not be proportional to
the military gain in the case of indiscriminate bombing of a large city
having little military significance. This custom should apply not only
to conventional, but also to tactical nuclear weapons. The same values
and considerations supporting the customary rule regarding conven-
tional weapon use would appear to be equally applicable to the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. Proportionality will be determined by the
individual circumstance as it applies to military necessity.
52. Mallison, supra note 43, at 313.
53. United States v. List, II Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Law No. 10, 757, 1253-54 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
Trials of War Crimes].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Bright, supra note 13, at 33.
57. Land Warfare, supra note 51, at 19.
Vol. 7
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There is a close relationship between the custom of propor-
tionality and the custom of immunity of noncombatants. Throughout
the history of war, unarmed civilians have suffered because their
cities, factories or transportation systems were attacked. The problem
is actually one of determining whether the dangers to civilians are
disproportionate to the value of the target sought. The location of
military targets within heavily populated areas will not erase the
combatant's obligation to evaluate the proportional relationship be-
tween the probable injury to the population and the military exigencies
of the action.
58
Both nuclear and conventional weapons should be subjected to
these standards of humanity, military necessity, proportionality and
effect upon noncombatants. To categorize all nuclear use as dispropor-
tionate and inhumane would be an oversimplification. The weapon
must be judged according to its particular capabilities and the factual
setting. The nuclear weapon's yield, fusing and other factors have
been shown to be determinative in controlling its destructive
capabilities 59
The nuclear device detonated in the hypothetical combat situation
described at the beginning of this comment would certainly comply
with the above standards. The low yield of the weapon and its height of
burst would preclude significant fallout. Thus, noncombatants outside
the immediate target area would not be affected. Further, the lack of
civilian casualties in that conflict certainly would render civilian injury
proportional to the military significance of the target.
C. Conventions: Attempts to Delineate Standards
for the Conduct of War
There are no treaties or conventions specifically addressing the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons during hostilities. 6° Most con-
58. Mallison, supra note 43, at 322-23.
59. See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
60. Mallison, supra note 43, at 332. It should be noted, however, that the United
States and the United Kingdom entered into the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty wherein those states agreed not to use nuclear weapons against contracting
parties. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14,
1967, Additional Protocol II, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364.
The nonproliferation, treaties do not address the legality or limitations of nuclear
use, but attempt to limit the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and distribution of
nuclear materials. The first strike policy affects the issue of nonproliferation in that if the
United States were to renounce its first use policy, nonnuclear third powers might
develop independent nuclear arsenals of their own. For a discussion of nonproliferation
aspects in regard to first use policy, see Hearings on Nuclear First Use, supra note 2, at
97-141.
10
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ventions cited by international legal writers were formulated before the
advent of the nuclear device as a means of warfare. Consequently,
some speculation is necessary in correlating existing conventions with
nuclear warfare.
The United Nations has attempted to take a strong stand against
the use of nuclear devices. In 1961, the General Assembly passed a
resolution declaring the use of nuclear weapons to be in violation of the
United Nation's Charter. 61 That resolution further set forth the proposi-
tion that nuclear detonation is contrary to the laws of humanity because
it causes unnecessary suffering and is indiscriminate against noncom-
batants. 62 It should be noted, however, that the United Nations cannot
bind its members through a resolution. 63 Moreover, it would be dif-
ficult to argue that the resolution exemplifies accepted customary
law. 64 The better approach would be to evaluate the propriety of any
nuclear application with specific regard to all the circumstances sur-
rounding the detonation.
61. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 4, U.N. Doc. A/5116 (1961).
62. Id.
63. As one scholar writes:
Of course, the General Assembly does not have the legislative powers to bind
all members by a resolution of this nature. Furthermore, a resolution does not
have the effect of a formal treaty upon even the members voting for it; it is a
statement of policy, rather than positive international law. But a resolution,
which is no more than a recommendation of the General Assembly, is an
important instrument in weighing world public opinion, particularly as to
official positions of the individual nations voting on the resolution.
Bright, supra note 13, at 28 (footnotes omitted). See BRIERLY, supra note 45, at 109-10,
where in his famous treatise, THE LAW OF NATIONS, he discusses the functions and
powers of the United Nations General Assembly:
The specific functions of the General Assembly, which consists of all the
members of the Organization, are to discuss any matter within the scope of the
Charter and to make recommendations thereon either to the members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both, but this is subject to the
proviso that it must refer to the Security Council any question relating to
international peace on which action is necessary, and that it may not make any
recommendations on a dispute or situation which is being dealt with by the
Security Council . . . . [A]part from its control over the budget, all that the
General Assembly can do is to discuss and recommend and initiate studies and
consider reports from other bodies. It cannot act on behalf of all the members,
as the Security Council does, and its decisions are not directions telling the
member states what they are or are not to do.
Id.
64. As Bright states:
While an argument may be made that such a resolution reflects an internation-
al custom against the use of nuclear weapons, the concern of states over
armaments is certainly distinguishable from a custom against using them. The
position which the various states took in voting on the resolution may be
considered as some evidence of their official view towards the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons, but the mere consensus of a majority of the members
voting on the resolution is not declaratory of customary international law,
unless such a custom has, in fact, been established.
Bright, supra note 13, at 28-29.
Vol. 7
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Even though nuclear weapons had already been employed by the
end of World War II, the Geneva Convention of 194765 failed to
address the issue of nuclear warfare and its impact upon the laws of
war. The convention dealt with three humanitarian problems of war:
treatment of the wounded and sick, care of the prisoner of war and the
protection of civilians. 66 Further protection for the civilian was ex-
pounded in the suggestions set forth by the International Committee of
the Red Cross in 1956. An example of these suggestions can be found
in the following:
The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack
shall, first of all: (a) make sure that the objective, or objec-
tives, to be attacked are military objectives within the mean-
ing of the present rule and duly identified. When the military
advantage to be gained leaves the choice open between sev-
eral objectives, he is required to select the one, an attack on
which involves least danger for the civilian
population. 67
Restrictions such as those above can be applied equally to con-
ventional or to tactical nuclear weapons. Computations involving the
factors previously discussed 68 would be helpful in determining which
detonations would create the least hazard to civilian populations.
Attempts have been made to demonstrate a relationship between
nuclear radiation, poison and gas. The Hague Convention No. IV of
190769 forbade the use of poison or poisoned weapons in conducting
war. 70 Also, the Geneva Gas Protocol 71 condemns the use of "asphyx-
iating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials
or devices." 72 Relying on these conventions, various authors have
65. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [1956],6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949 [1956], 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949 [1956], 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
66. Id.
67. International Committee of the Red Cross: Draft Rules for the Limitation of the
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, art. 8(a) (1956).
68. See generally textual discussion in division I C, supra.
69. Convention with Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 (effective Feb. 28, 1910) [hereinafter cited as
Land War Convention].
70. Id. at 2301-02.
71. Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 67
[hereinafter cited as Geneva Gas Protocol].
72. Id.
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argued that there is an assimilation of radiation and radioactive fallout
into "poison. '" 73 That conclusion is based on the internal effects
radiation can produce within the body and similarities between the
effects of radiation and poison.
There is also support for the contrary position.74 One author'
concludes that most radiation affects the external portion of the body
and does not involve ingestion within the system. He further argues
that delayed fallout loses its radioactivity fairly rapidly and will pro-
duce "little, if any, injurious results.,71
Regardless of which view is accepted, a case can be made that
tactical nuclear devices should be exempt from the poison classifica-
tion. A low yield, low altitude detonation would result in blast and
radiation effects within the same geographic area. 76 There would be
negligible fallout and most injuries would result from the blast effect. 7
It is the incidental nature of radiation injury which makes it improper
to classify such injury as identical to the damage resulting from the
deliberate emission of poisons into the environment.
Whether or not a tactical nuclear weapon is considered "poison-
ous," there is still an argument that its use would result in "treacher-
ous killing" or in "causing unnecessary suffering." This would con-
stitute a violation of article 23(b) and (e) of the Hague Convention No.
IV of 1907 which provides:
[I]t is especially forbidden: . .. (b) to kill or wound
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army . . . . (e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.78
How is a weapon employed to "treacherously" wound or kill an
individual? Article 23(b) conceiveably applies to all weapons, for any
weapon is capable of being employed treacherously. A high yield
nuclear device detonated to create large scale fallout probably would
73. See, e.g., N. SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 156-60
(1959); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 27 (1968).
74. Bright, supra note 13, at 19.
75. Id. at 18.
76. See generally Nuclear Effects Manual, supra note 8.
77. A fission weapon detonated at an air burst altitude will typically distribute the
following approximate energy release: blast, 50 percent; thermal radiation, 35 percent;
initial radiation, 5 percent; with residual nuclear radiation, 10 percent. A thermonuclear
weapon will release reversed percentages between the initial and residual radiation.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 15, at 8-9. For radius effects data, see generally
Nuclear Effects Manual, supra note 8.
78. Land War Convention, supra note 69, at 2302.
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be considered "treacherous." 79 Conversely, if a tactical nuclear de-
vice is employed in a manner which precludes significant fallout and
ancillary civilian destruction, 8° it should not be called "treacherous."
"[T]he mere fact that a weapon is capable of being used treacherously
certainly does not support the proposition that its every use is necessar-
ily treacherous.' '81
With regard to the difficult task of defining "unnecessary suffer-
ing", Professor Mallison has suggested that a reasonable definition
would be: any suffering which is unnecessary "in relation to the
military advantage to be derived from the use of the weapon."82 This
seems to call for an application of the principle of proportionality, in
which a state must weigh the suffering and destruction a weapon will
cause against the military objective and its degree of necessity. Under
this analysis, the use of any nuclear weapon should not be considered
as categorically prohibited by article 23(e).
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF STANDARDS LIMITING
THE USE OF WEAPONS
There is a paucity of international judicial precedent bearing on
the application of international legal principles, customs and conven-
tions pertaining to nuclear use. This circumstance calls for close
scrutiny of the few existing cases.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
provided that the "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity" were to be considered
war crimes. 83 However, the Tribunal only prosecuted a few persons for
mass killing of noncombatants by aerial bombings, and summarily
rejected cases in which the target included military objectives.
84
79. See Bright, supra note 13, at 323. That commentator has advanced an unusual
analogy as to what might constitute a treacherous violation of article 23(b):
If a nuclear weapon were employed in such a manner as to permeate intention-
ally cloud masses with radioactive material, resulting in a subsequent contami-
nation rainout on the unsuspecting enemy, such an act would probably consti-
tute treachery in violation of Article 23(b).
Id.
80. Professor Mallison has emphasized that ancillary civilian destruction must be
considered in making "An accurate appraisal of lawfulness . Mallison, supra note
43, at 346.
81. Bright, supra note 13, at 323. Mr. Bright holds the view that a weapon is an
inanimate object and is "incapable of being per se treacherous." Id.
82. Mallison, supra note 43, at 323. Professor Mallison supports the proposition
that a weapon should not be outlawed because of its efficiency measuring device
advanced in the text.
83. Charter of Int'l Military Tribunal, art. 6(b) in I Int'l Military Tribunal 11 (1947).
84. The United Nations War Crime Commission rejected cases of alleged illegal
aerial bombardment where military objectives were present at the targets bombed.
Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 Reps. U.N. Comm'n 110 n.2.
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In United States v. Ohlendor,8 5 the Tribunal was faced with the
prosecution of members of the special task forces used by Nazi Ger-
many in liquidating "elements of the civilian population regarded as
'racially' inferior or 'politically undesirable'.''86 The defendants ar-
gued that their actions could not be distinguished from the United
States killing of civilians through the atomic detonations in Japan.
87
However, the specific process by which the defendants had confronted
and destroyed noncombatants was distinguished easily by the Tribunal
from the atomic bombings of Japan. The judgment indicated that
tactical purposes such as the destruction of communications, transpor-
tation systems, and factories are objectives directed at impeding the
military. It was reasoned that nonmilitary casualties such as those
resulting from the use of atomic weapons in Japan, are the inevitable
consequence of these bombing operations and are "an unavoidable
corollary of battle action." 88 Thus, even though the Ohlendorf tribunal
was not called on to determine the legality of the United States' atomic
bombings in Japan, the case strongly suggests that th bombings would
be defensible, given the significance of military objectives within the
target cities.
89
Shimoda v. Japan9° is the only judicial decision which squarely
addresses the issue of nuclear weapon employment during warfare.
Although rendered by a municipal court, such a decision is not without
international effect, in the absence of a conflicting principle of interna-
tional law.
9 1
85. The Einsatzgruppen Case, 4 Trials of War Crimes 1 (1947).
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 466-67.
88. Id. at 467.
89. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War during World War II, discussed the
military objectives in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 194 HARPER'S MAGAZINE,
Feb. 1947, at 97. Criticism of that decision appears in Sack, ABC-Atomic, Biological,
Chemical Warfare in International Law, 10 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 161 (1950).
90. Tokyo District Court, No. 2914 of 1955 and No. 4177 of 1957, Civil Affairs,
24th Department, Dec. 7, 1963; the decision has been translated into English and
reprinted in full in THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212 (1964) [hereinafter all citation
is to translation]. See also Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic
Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1965).
91. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. d. In addressing the subject of article 38(d) of the
I.C.J., Brierly has written:
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court directs it to refer to "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." The phrase is a wide one; it
includes, though it is not limited to, the principle of private law administered in
national courts where these are applicable to international relations. Private
law, being in general more developed than international law, has always
constituted a reserve store of principles upon which the latter has been in the
habit of drawing.
BRIERLY, supra note 45, at 62 (footnotes omitted).
Vol. 7
15
Lee: The United States' Nuclear First Strike Position: A Legal Apprais
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE POSITION
The case involved a suit by five Japanese citizens who personally
suffered injury or were survivors of victims of the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These plaintiffs claimed that the detonation
of the atomic weapons by the United States was in violation of
international law.92 Also, it was argued that they had been deprived of
their right to recover damages when the government of Japan waived
all claims of the state and its nationals in the peace treaty at the end of
the war. 93 The court denied recovery and indicated that the government
of Japan had acted within its powers in waiving its nationals' claims
through the treaty. Finally, it was determined by the Japanese court
that the claimants lacked standing under international law.
94
The legality of the bombings was addressed by the court in dicta.
In concluding that international law had been violated, the court
determined that both cities had been undefended, that the atomic
deployment had constituted indiscriminate aerial bombardment,95 and
that the bombs caused unnecessary suffering in violation of article
23(e) of the Hague Regulations.
96
It has been suggested that the Shimoda opinion is of little signifi-
cance "to the development of the international laws governing
weaponry." 97 That conclusion was founded upon three bases: The
relevant portions of the opinion are considered as dicta; the court's
opinion relates only to the factual situation present in that particular
case; and the opinion was rendered by "a domestic court of the
sovereign of the complaining parties. "
98
The contrary position, which regards the civilian destruction to
have been disproportionate to the value of the military goals achieved,
seems more compelling. The estimated combined casualties were over
106,000 killed and more than 97,000 injured. 99 The targets were in
high density population zones where a ninety percent fatality rate
resulted. t° Any such expression of hostility, whether undertaken
through tactical, strategic or conventional means, flies in the face of
the relevant principle, expressed by one author as the following cus-
tomary rule.
92. Shimoda v. Japan, THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212, 213-14 (1964).
93. Id. at 218.
94. Id. at 250.
95. Id. at 252.
96. Land War Convention, supra note 69, at 2301-02.
97. See Bright, supra note 13, at 37.
98. Id. at 36-37.
99. Id. at 8. The chart on page eight of that article depicts a three zone breakdown
for such city and population effect within the zones.
100. Id.
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Noncombatants may not be attacked directly consistent with
the law of war and it is not lawful to employ highly destruc-
tive methods against them. 101
IV. THE NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE: AN APPRAISAL
OF LAW AND POLICY
The United States has endorsed a limited first strike policy. Even
though deterrence was probably the controlling motive for adopting
such a position, it would seem that the United States would not be
without international legal alternatives in the event that circumstances
directed the implementation of the policy.
There is no legal basis in existing international law to support the
conclusion that the use of nuclear weaponry would be unlawful per se.
A nuclear deployment, consistent with the rules governing conven-
tional warfare, need not be held to a different standard. If a nuclear
response appears militarily necessary and undertaken without violating
the principles of humanity, proportionality, and the protection of the
noncombatant, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that interna-
tional legal concern be focused upon the ends which result, rather than
the means through which those ends were achieved. Even a small
weapon, when used against a heavily populated target, can cause
ancillary civilian destruction which is disproportionate to the military
objective sought. However, the sophistication of technology has made
it possible to employ a nuclear weapon with almost "surgical" preci-
sion. The effects of cautious and deliberate nuclear use would not be
legally distinguishable from the effects of conventional warfare.
It is not the purpose of this comment to promote the use of tactical
nuclear weaponry, but rather to encourage a full appreciation of the
difference between a limited tactical nuclear engagement and an un-
limited strategic strike. Concerning limited nuclear warfare it has been
said:
Atomic warfare can be kept limited only if the world-friend
and foe alike-knows the types and small sizes of weapons
which could be used and understands the vast difference
between precision atomic warfare and mass destruction war-
fare. 1
02
The international community would be safer if all nuclear devices
were banned and realistic controls established. Unfortunately, such a
101. Mallison, supra note 43, at 309.
102. Cagle, A Philosophy for Naval Atomic War, 83 NAVAL INST. PROC. 249, 254
(1957), reviewed, Patterson, 83 NAVAL INST. PRoc. 659 (1957).
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prospect is unlikely in the immediate future. As a realistic alternative,
the nuclear powers should begin to negotiate towards an agreement
which would delineate standards by which these weapons may be
employed. The stakes are too hiqh to leave to chance or supposition the
probability that the "other side" in a conflict will utilize the same
standards for nuclear deployment. A multilateral agreement setting
forth those standards would contribute at the least to avoidance of a
high yield strategic retaliation in response to a low yield tactical first
use. Because the United States has announced a nuclear first strike
policy, 03 it would be significant for that government to initiate negoti-
ations for such an agreement. If states continue to proclaim policies and
prepare for possible implementation of initial retaliatory nuclear
strikes, the world community will be subjected to the possibility of
nuclear extinction. This possibility will be avoided only by agreement;
adherence to at least the minimal standards of humanity and propor-
tionality demanded by international law suggests itself as a starting
place which would be effective, inoffensive to international law, and
sufficiently modest to be achievable.
William G. Lee
103. President Carter made the latest proclamation on United States nuclear first
strike policy as this article went to press. While addressing the United Nations General
Assembly, President Carter stated:
I hereby declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear
weapons except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an actual nuclear
or conventional attack on the United States, our territories or armed forces, or
such an attack on our allies.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1977, at A12, col. 6.
This enunciated policy conforms with Mr. Schlesinger's previods statements and
former administration positions. It has been noted that "the pledge was worded so it
would not exclude the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate if, for example, an ally such
as West Germany were to be attacked with even conventional arms." N.Y. Times, Oct.
5, 1977, at A13, col. 1.
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